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Introduction
Flat income tax, referring broadly to a tax with a single marginal rate, is becoming increasingly popular. Before the 1990s it was only applied in a few countries, most prominently Hong Kong and the Channel Islands. Since 1994 however, after its introduction in Estonia, a number of countries have followed suit. In 2008 there were altogether 26 countries worldwide with ‡at tax systems, of which about half are in Eastern Europe, and such proposals being discussed in several other countries including some in Western Europe.
1 However, among the latter only
Iceland recently adopted a ‡at tax. There are three main bene…ts usually associated with ‡at tax systems. First, ‡at taxes may enhance labour supply incentives. Although there is a trend of lowering marginal statutory tax rates (and reducing the number of tax brackets), top rates can still be rather high in existing systems, e.g. around 40-60% in EU15 (see Eurostat (2007) ). While the gains from lower and ‡at tax rates are explicit for the top income range, they are not so obvious for low incomes. The results here depend on the chosen ‡at tax parameters and the underlying income distribution. Second, a ‡at tax can increase tax compliance and reduce tax evasion. This argument is perhaps weaker in developed countries, but it is often central for this kind of reform in developing and transition countries. Third, as a ‡at tax is often a part of more fundamental tax reform, it can simplify income taxation signi…cantly. The current systems in Europe have typically evolved to quite complex entities, often violating the principle that taxes ought to be clear and simple. A simpler system is not only easier to grasp from the point of view of a single taxpayer, but is also more transparent at the aggregated level. Simpli…cation can also decrease the costs of administration and compliance.
However, ‡at taxes can have a serious drawback in terms of their impact on the distribution of tax burdens which could be the main reason limiting its spread in developed countries with a well established middle class. Previous ‡at tax reforms and typical proposals lower marginal tax rates at the high income levels but increase the tax burden for middle-income ranges, resulting in a widening of the distribution of after-tax incomes.
Only two actual reforms have been examined in the literature: the 2001 Russian reform by Ivanova et al. (2005) and the 2004 reform in the Slovak Republic by, among others, Brook and Leibfritz (2005) . In the Russian case, the reform was followed by signi…cant real growth in personal income tax revenue, but there was no strong evidence that this was caused by the reform itself or by improved law enforcement, nor could any positive labour supply responses be identi…ed. 2 The Slovakian reform was expected to be revenue neutral, to increase the level and e¢ ciency of capital formation and enhance the incentives of unemployed workers to seek work. However, no evidence apart from revenue-neutrality has been reported yet. While it is true that most real world reforms have been very recent, research on their e¤ects is probably also limited due to the lack in those countries of high-quality (micro-)data for the pre-reform period.
In the discussion of the ‡at tax "a notable and troubling feature [...] is that it has been marked more by rhetoric and assertion than by analysis and evidence". 3 Given that ‡at taxes
have not yet been implemented in Western countries, the e¤ects of ‡at tax reforms in these countries can only be studied on the basis of simulation models. There have been several previous studies, focussing on a single country and hypothetical reforms in most cases. In a study for the Netherlands, Caminada and Goudswaard (2001) derive the result that a ‡at tax would yield redistribution at the expense of the lowest income deciles, but the magnitude of these e¤ects is quite small. Several studies, like Aaberge et al. (2000) for Italy, Norway and Sweden, Kuismanen (2000) for Finland, Adam and Browne (2006) for the UK, González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) for Spain 4 , and Decoster and Orsini (2007) for Belgium, …nd that, in addition to redistribution in favour of high income households, the hypothetical introduction of a ‡at tax would increase labour supply (incentives). Benedek and Lelkes (2007) simulate a ‡at tax reform for Hungary. They do not consider work incentives but also …nd that the reform would lead to a sharp increase in after tax income inequality. Fuest et al. (2008) show for Germany that a ‡at tax with a high basic allowance and a single rate has less harmful distributional e¤ects than a ‡at tax with a low rate. The latter scenario, however, is the only alternative that leads to positive, albeit small, labour supply and welfare e¤ects. Jacobs et al. (2007) analyse two revenue neutral ‡at tax scenarios on the basis of a computable general equilibrium model calibrated for the Netherlands. The low ‡at rate scenario increases inequality because taxes on low incomes increase whereas high income earners bene…t. There are positive e¤ects on employment, which increases by 1.4 per cent. In the second scenario, the general tax credit and the marginal rate are higher. Now, also low incomes bene…t due to the higher tax credit, while very high incomes gain less than in the low tax scenario. Middle income households, however, face an increasing tax burden. Aggregate labour supply and employment fall. The aim of this paper is to undertake a systematic approach for choosing ‡at tax parameters a rather large tax administration to ensure tax compliance. Therefore, we assume e¤ects of a ‡at tax reform on compliance to be less important than in transition countries of Eastern Europe. 3 Keen et al. (2007) , p. 3. 4 The …ndings in González-Torrabadella and Pijoan-Mas (2006) di¤er from the other country studies in the magnitude of the simulated e¢ ciency gains. While most studies …nd rather small gains, their model predicts an increase in output by more than 5%. They argue that this is driven mostly by an increase in capital formation, not in employment.
for a comparative analysis of di¤erent ‡at tax designs for selected Western European countries. Davies and Hoy (2002) show that in the case of revenue neutral ‡at tax reforms there are two sets of critical parameter values: a lower bound of the ‡at tax rate below which inequality is always higher compared to a given graduated rate tax, and an upper bound above which inequality is always lower. We rely on these theoretical insights to systematically construct hypothetical ‡at tax reforms and analyse the distributional and incentive e¤ects of their implementation in European countries.
We use EUROMOD, a tax-bene…t microsimulation model for the EU15, to compare the results across countries in a common framework. Among others, we study the e¤ects on polarisation, which can be used as an indicator of the strength of the middle class. We ask whether di¤erent combinations of tax rates and allowances always have an adverse e¤ect on the middle class and if there are indeed positive incentive e¤ects. We concentrate on the short-term static e¤ects assuming that these decide the political feasibility of a tax reform although there are possibly important long-term e¤ects as well.
5
Our analysis yields the following results. The ‡at tax rates required to attain revenue neutrality with existing basic allowances (lower boundary) improve labour supply incentives. However, they bene…t mainly those with high incomes at the expense of low and middle income households, resulting in more inequality, poverty and polarisation of the income distributions. On the other hand, revenue neutral ‡at rates necessary to keep the inequality levels unchanged are rather high and lead to ambiguous incentive e¤ects. In general, a revenue neutral ‡at tax reform cannot overcome the fundamental equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤, but in some cases an increase in equality and work incentives is possible. We show that the di¤erent underlying income distributions and compositions of welfare state regimes play a key role for the results in terms of both equity and e¢ ciency. Overall, this could contribute to explaining why ‡at taxes have not been politically successful in Western Europe so far. This also suggests that Mediterranean countries with a rather small middle-class due to high polarisation are more likely to bene…t from such a reform.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a discussion on the ‡at tax design. Section 3 contains a short description of the model, datasets and our reform scenarios. Section 4 illustrates the distributional e¤ects in terms of inequality, poverty and richness, polarisation, winners and losers as well as the incentive e¤ects in terms of e¤ective marginal and average tax rates. Section 5 concludes.
5 People tend to judge future gains and losses asymmetrically (see e.g. the "prospect theory" by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ). Starting from a reference point (status quo) and given the same variation in absolute values, there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains (loss aversion). Furthermore, people prefer the status quo over uncertain outcomes in the future ("status-quo-bias", see Kahneman et al. (1991) ). Therefore, short-term losses in comparison to the status quo can have a much stronger impact than (possible) future gains. Hence, the short term e¤ects presented here could be decisive.
Flat tax design
Flat tax implies that some sort of proportionality is embedded in the income tax system, i.e. income is taxed at the same ( ‡at) rate along the whole range of income. Its design, however, can be very di¤erent. There are two dimensions to be distinguished: tax schedule and tax base. In general, a tax schedule can apply the same rate on all sources of income (i.e. comprehensive tax) or di¤erent rates on di¤erent types of incomes (i.e. schedular tax). Most countries with a ‡at tax system apply di¤erent rates to personal and corporate income, although a common rate has become more popular among the countries recently implementing these systems. Usually, the tax rate does not vary for components of personal income, i.e. capital and labour income is taxed at the same marginal rate independent of the level of income. There is also a number of countries which tax only capital income at a ‡at rate and levy a progressive rate schedule on labour income. However, these are usually not considered as ‡at tax systems but dual or semidual income tax systems. 6 For the tax base one can di¤erentiate between concepts allowing or not allowing for any allowances or deductions. Certainly, only the ‡at tax without any tax reliefs is a "pure" ‡at tax as in this case tax payments are indeed proportional to incomes. A ‡at income tax as such has only been applied in Georgia and recently in Bulgaria. In all other cases, the tax incidence on incomes is progressive, i.e. a single marginal ‡at tax rate t is combined with a general personal ‡at tax allowance a. This is also what we consider in this paper:
An important aspect which has been rarely addressed in previous studies is the setting of tax system parameters for the ex ante analysis of hypothetical tax reforms. In terms of ‡at tax reforms this translates into the question of how to set the ‡at tax rate and the basic allowance. In our case we are interested in the relationship between ‡at tax parameters and distributional e¤ects.
7 Davies and Hoy (2002) show theoretically that the inequality of after-tax distribution of income is monotonically declining in the ‡at tax rate and the associated level of basic allowance generating the same tax yield. 8 Furthermore, for revenue neutral tax reforms replacing a graduated rate tax (GRT) with a ‡at rate tax (FRT), they prove the existence of critical ‡at tax rates such that compared to the (existing) graduated rate tax after-tax income 6 See OECD (2006) for more about dual income tax systems. These countries include e.g. the Scandinavian countries. 7 The setting of the key ‡at tax design features (marginal rate, basic allowance, tax base) crucially depends on the objective of the reform (like simplifying the system, improving compliance, broadening the tax base, increasing or decreasing the tax burden for selected groups, higher, lower or constant revenue) and if other reforms (like shifting tax burden between direct and indirect taxes or taxes and social insurance) are planned to accompany the ‡at tax introduction.
8 As a ‡at tax schedule has only two parameters -marginal rate and basic allowance -it is only possible to choose one freely when accounting for revenue neutrality. inequality is:
A) the same for a given inequality index at a certain ‡at tax rate, t = t F 2 (t Figure 1 illustrates these regularities. In other words: when moving from a graduated income tax to a ‡at tax system that yields the same revenue, three critical ‡at tax rate values with respect to after-tax income inequality exist. The …rst depends on the chosen inequality index, the other two do not, i.e. they stem from the concept of Lorenz dominance. First, for a given inequality index I, a ‡at rate value t F can be found such that inequality remains unchanged. Further on, inequality in terms of this index is always higher (lower) below (above) this critical value after the ‡at tax introduction. Second, there exist a lower bound t l F such that for all marginal rates below this critical value inequality in terms of any inequality measure is always higher than compared to the existing system (i.e. the existing graduated rate tax Lorenz dominates the ‡at tax). Third, inequality is always lower above an upper bound t u F according to any inequality index (i.e. the ‡at tax Lorenz dominates the existing graduated rate tax). These regularities apply to any inequality measure satisfying the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and under the assumption that behaviour is not a¤ected by tax system changes.
The lower bound corresponds to a ‡at tax rate if the personal allowance is …xed, i.e. is at the same level as for the pre-reform graduated rate tax. The upper bound is such that a person with the highest income pays the same tax under each scheme. Additionally, the ‡at rate at the lower bound is supposed to exceed the lowest marginal tax rate under the graduated rate and the ‡at rate at the upper bound remains below the highest marginal tax rate under the graduated rate. The critical value between those boundaries cannot be determined a priori as it depends on a chosen inequality index. 9 We rely on these theoretical insights to systematically construct hypothetical ‡at tax reforms. However, these theoretical regularities are only approximations for empirical estimations because existing tax systems are further complicated by the presence of other tax deductions and allowances. Some systems do not even have a (well-de…ned) basic allowance to start with. More so, the de…nition of revenue neutrality is not straightforward. If revenue neutrality is only limited to income taxes then it might not preserve the mean of the disposable income distribution, as there are often instruments whose eligibility or amount depend on net income after taxes (e.g. means-tested non-taxable bene…ts) and, therefore, might change their value when tax systems are modi…ed. If the overall net balance from taxes and bene…ts is retained then income tax revenues rarely remain constant. Further on, the premise of ex-ante revenue neutrality (i.e. without behavioural responses) is a rather strong assumption but it is necessary to apply the Davies and Hoy (2002) approach. 10 In practice, most countries have introduced a ‡at tax rate at or close to the level of previous lowest marginal rate. Exceptions are Latvia and Lithuania who have chosen rates close to the previous highest marginal rate (Nicodeme (2007) ). The Slovak Republic and Estonia initially opted for a rate in the middle range, although the latter is now gradually moving towards the former lowest marginal rate as well. The pattern of setting basic allowances however is less clear. In most countries an allowance in …xed amount was retained or introduced. Exceptions include Russia with gradual withdrawal and Ukraine with sudden withdrawal above certain income levels which makes the e¤ective marginal tax rate high at some stages. However, the amount of allowance varies signi…cantly, most countries having it increased during the reforms (Keen et al. (2007) ). For example, Georgia has no allowance at all, the allowance in Russia was about 12% of the average gross wage in the year before and after the reform (i.e. 2000-01), in Estonia it was 40-74% of the minimum wage and 11-21% of the average gross wage in 1994-2006, and in the Slovak Republic it exceeded the minimum wage and was about 60% of the average wage in 2004, more than doubled with the reform (see Brook and Leibfritz (2005) ).
9 Chiu (2007) demonstrates further that for an index exhibiting downside inequality aversion this value is determined by the strength of the index's downside inequality aversion against its inequality aversion. In the case of Generalized Entropy Indices E( ), since a higher indicates a weaker downside inequality aversion against inequality aversion, it also implies a higher critical ‡at tax rate between the boundaries.
10 If the scenarios were chosen to be revenue neutral ex-post, i.e. after labour supply reactions, the marginal tax rates could be lower (higher) in case of increasing (decreasing) labour supply but the underlying research question would be di¤erent. Our aim is to analyse scenarios that are equal ex-ante and to reveal the ex-post di¤erences by analysing the economic e¤ects of the scenarios in terms of equity and e¢ ciency.
Flat tax simulations 3.1 EUROMOD: model and database
We use the microsimulation technique to simulate taxes, bene…ts and disposable incomes under di¤erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households. Simulations are done with EUROMOD, a static tax-bene…t model covering the EU15 countries. Our analysis is based on the 2003 tax-bene…t systems, which is the most recent wave currently available in EUROMOD but limited to 10 countries, excluding Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy and Sweden (see also Figure 11 in Appendix A).
The main stages of the simulations are the following. First, a micro-data sample and taxbene…t rules are read into the model. Then for each tax and bene…t instrument, the model constructs corresponding units of assessment, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of bene…t or tax liability. The result is then either assigned to an individual or allocated to members of the tax unit. Finally, after all taxes and bene…ts in question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
EUROMOD is characterised by greater ‡exibility than typical national models, to accommodate a range of di¤erent tax-bene…t systems. For instance, the model can easily handle di¤erent units of assessment, income de…nitions for tax bases and bene…t means-tests, the order and structure of instruments. Overall, a common framework allows the comparison of countries in a consistent way.
EUROMOD covers only monetary incomes, excluding capital gains and irregular incomes. It can simulate most direct taxes and bene…ts except those based on previous contributions as this information is usually not available from the cross-sectional survey data used by EUROMOD as input datasets. The model assumes full bene…t take-up and tax compliance. Although the latter is an important aspect of ‡at tax reforms, we do not consider changes in compliance here and limit our analysis to …rst-order static e¤ects only. Table 2 in Appendix A gives an overview of the input datasets for EUROMOD. Their sample size varies across countries from less than 2,500 to more than 11,000 households. All monetary variables are updated to year 2003 using country-speci…c uprating factors, as the survey period for incomes varies from 1999 to 2003. Where net incomes were recorded in the original data, gross incomes have been also imputed. For further information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2001) and Sutherland (2007) .
Current income tax systems
The existing income tax systems in the 10 countries under consideration are quite varied. As of 2003, all have graduated rate schedules with a number of brackets ranging from 3 (UK) to 16 (Luxembourg) and the highest marginal tax rate from 38% (Luxembourg) to about 55% (Finland, state and local rate combined). All schedules are piecewise linear except that of Germany which has a unique continuous function for tax rates at some income levels. Seven countries have a general basic allowance, often integrated into the tax schedule; the Netherlands and Portugal apply general (wastable) tax credits and Austria uses both elements. About half of the countries tax capital income (and property income) together with other income and the rest tax it separately applying a ‡at rate (of 15-30%), in Belgium this is optional.
The countries also di¤er in the unit of assessment. Again, half of them allow only individual taxation, four countries apply either optional or compulsory joint taxation and Belgium provides limited income sharing for married couples. Nevertheless, even systems based on individual taxation often have elements assessed at family level or couple level (e.g. family or child allowances) or allow the sharing of non-labour income or household expenditures (e.g. property income, mortgage payments). Table 3 in Appendix A summarises these characteristics.
Overall, although there are few countries with relatively simple income tax systems (e.g. UK), most of them can be characterised as complex systems with the combination of many different elements and varying tax units. Additional examples of complexities include progression adjustments in Austria and Germany, income taxation both at the state and the local level in Finland, and an integrated schedule of social insurance contributions and income tax in the Netherlands.
Reform scenarios
In our ‡at tax reform simulations we replace all existing personal income tax deductions, allowances and credits with a single personal allowance (which is equivalent to a wastable, i.e. non-refundable, tax credit), and each graduated rate schedule with a ‡at rate. We only keep refundable tax credits as these are equivalent to bene…ts.
11 In countries where capital income was taxed at a separate rate, we abolish this separate rate and include capital income in the ‡at tax base. Therefore, our reform scenarios have a good potential to simplify the systems (due to fewer speci…c deductions) and make them more transparent.
taxes and do not modify existing social insurance contribution schemes (SIC) 13 or bene…ts. One could also carry out an exercise of simply ‡attening tax rate schedules without adjusting the tax base, but this would result in higher ‡at tax rates due to retained exceptions, therefore, limiting gains in terms of incentives. We simulate the following three ‡at income tax scenarios for each country:
a revenue neutral ‡at rate with a basic allowance in the existing (or equivalent) amount (S1), a 10 percentage points higher ‡at rate compared to the …rst scenario and an increased tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality (S2), a 20 percentage points higher ‡at rate compared to the …rst scenario and an increased tax allowance to preserve revenue neutrality (S3).
All scenarios are revenue neutral with the total income tax revenue within 0.1% limits of its baseline value. In terms of Davies and Hoy (2002) approach, our …rst scenario should approximately correspond to the lower bound. Because of additional complexities discussed in section 2 exact critical ‡at tax rates cannot be identi…ed in a straightforward manner. The 10 and 20 percentage point higher tax rate under the second and the third scenario are chosen to explore the e¤ect on inequality potentially around the upper bound.
14 Figure 2 plots the ‡at tax rate under each scenario and the lowest and highest (positive) tax rate of the existing tax rate schedules. Because of revenue neutrality the tax allowance is not independent of the tax rate. There is notable variation in the ‡at tax rate under the …rst scenario (11.6-33.9%). This variation results from the combination of the underlying pretax income distribution and average e¤ective tax burden under the existing system. This also a¤ects the other two scenarios. However, it turns out that for most countries the range of ‡at tax rates under three scenarios roughly matches the range of existing tax rates. A notable exception is the Netherlands with a very wide range of graduated tax rates.
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As expected, ‡at tax rates under the …rst scenario are above the lowest rates in the existing schedules with only Portugal being slightly lower, which is possibly due to the elimination of 13 The use of social insurance contributions di¤ers considerably across European countries. Therefore, a SIC reform would raise further conceptual questions, e.g. if mandatory contributions should be interpreted as taxes or insurance premium.
14 One could also construct scenarios with varying increases in the tax rates across countries generating the same increase in inequality. This would lead to a slightly di¤erent research question with the focus more on the level of the tax rates than on inequality measures. We have chosen the approach of constant increases for a better comparability of scenarios across countries in terms of distributional e¤ects. 15 The integrated schedule of social insurance contributions and income tax in the Netherlands results in rather low income tax rates for the brackets where full contributions to the "People's Pensions Insurance"have to be paid and rather high rates above the SIC threshold. 
Simulation results
In this section we present the results of our analysis. First, we analyse the distributional e¤ects of the di¤erent scenarios. This is followed by the presentation of the progressivity e¤ects and then summarised by the share of winners and losers. Finally, we demonstrate how e¤ective average and marginal tax rates change according to the simulated reform scenarios.
able incomes. 17 To analyse income inequality we use the Gini coe¢ cient and the Generalised Entropy indices with sensitivity parameters = 0 (Mean Log Deviation), = 1 (Theil index) and = 2. Figure 3 presents the Gini coe¢ cient for each scenario, other measures are presented in Table 7 (Appendix B). Figure 3: Income inequality by the Gini coe¢ cient First, there are already distinct di¤erences between the countries in terms of inequality in the baseline scenario. Two groups are a¤erent: inequality is rather high in Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the UK, and is rather low in Continental Europe (Austria, Germany and the Benelux countries) and Finland. This classi…cation of countries corresponds to the typology by Esping-Andersen (1990) who di¤erentiates between three types of welfare states: conservative (Continental Europe), social-democratic (Nordic Europe) and liberal (Anglo-Saxon). Ferrera (1996) further adds a fourth category (Mediterranean) to this typology.
Introducing a revenue neutral ‡at tax increases inequality unambiguously only under the …rst scenario (S1), i.e. the lower bound. In the second scenario (S2) inequality decreases relative to the baseline for Finland and the UK (depending on the inequality measure for the latter) and in the third scenario (S3) also for Belgium, Germany, Greece and Portugal. 18 These di¤erences between countries can be explained to some extent by di¤erent tax systems and the resulting distribution of tax payments. The latter is rather narrow in Belgium, Finland and the UK, where inequality decreases, with a spread of the e¤ective average tax rate in the baseline between the lowest and highest decile of less than 20 percentage points whereas this spread in most other countries is around or well above 30 percentage points.
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The scenarios can be ranked according to the level of inequality as follows: I(S1) > I(S2) > I(S3). 20 The increases in inequality, however, are similar in absolute terms for most countries with FI and UK being slightly lower. The fact that inequality levels under the third scenario are below or close to those in the baseline scenario show that they correspond approximately to the critical value or upper boundary respectively.
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To analyse the e¤ects of ‡at taxes on poverty we compute the headcount index and the measures of Foster et al. (1984) based on the poverty line taken from the baseline scenario. 22 We compute the poverty lines as 60% of median equivalent income for each country. The results for the headcount ratio (FGT0) are plotted in Figure 4 and the full results are presented in Table 5 (Appendix B). Measuring richness is a much less considered …eld in the literature than poverty. We compute the headcount index and the measures of Peichl et al. (2006) which are analogously de…ned to the FGT indices of poverty. The richness line is computed as 200% of median equivalent income. The results for the headcount ratio are presented in Figure 5 and the full results in Figure 4: Poverty rates by the headcount ratio (with constant poverty line), % for the Netherlands in S3 and Finland and the UK in S2 and S3. When analysing poverty, one has to take into account the fact that the lowest deciles of the income distribution seldom pay income taxes. There is, therefore, limited scope for a reduction in income poverty through reduced marginal tax rates. The pattern of changes in richness measures matches closely the inequality measures, i.e. increasing richness in the …rst scenario for all countries and measures, decreasing richness for Finland and the UK in the second scenario relative to the baseline and additionally for Belgium and Germany in the third scenario. These e¤ects di¤er slightly when using more sophisticated richness measures (R ) that also account for changes in the dimension of richness and not only the number of people above a richness line. Richness is then also decreasing for Portugal and Greece in S3.
To assess the importance of the middle class we calculate the polarisation index of Schmidt (2004) . 24 The results are presented in Figure 6 . The polarisation of the income distribution 24 Schmidt (2004) creates a polarisation index which in analogy to the Gini index (Lorenz curve) is based on a polarisation curve for better comparability of the results and their interpretations. Generally speaking, polarisation is the occurrence of two antipodes. A rising income polarisation describes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an increasing gap between rich and poor. The proportion of middle income households is declining while the shares of the poor and the rich are both rising. Figure 5: Richness rates by the headcount ratio (with constant richness line), % is high in Southern countries and the UK and low in Continental Europe and Finland. A high income polarisation describes the phenomenon of a declining middle class resulting in an increasing gap between rich and poor. Therefore, the middle class is of less importance in the Southern countries and the UK. And indeed, in these countries, which have high baseline values of inequality, inequality decreases in scenario S3 (and S2 in the UK). The polarisation increases in most countries and scenarios (except for Finland and the UK in S2 and S3) implying a further declining middle class (see Table 7 in Appendix B). This measure is therefore summarising the e¤ects on poverty and richness.
Progressivity
To analyse the impact of ‡at tax reforms on the redistributive e¤ects of the tax system we compute several measures of tax progression. 25 Figure 7 presents the values for the Suits index.
In terms of progression the di¤erences between the countries in the baseline scenario are rather 25 We compute the measure of e¤ective progression by Musgrave and Thin (1948) ,
, the indices of disproportionality by Kakwani (1977) , Suits (1977) , P S = 1 L K ; where K denotes the area below the line of proportionality, and L denotes the area below the Lorenz curve of tax payments against income, and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) , P RS = G X C Y , as well as the redistributive e¤ect (of taxes) P RE = G X G Y (with Y disposable income, X gross income, T taxes, G Gini coe¢ cient and C coe¢ cient of concentration). See Table 10 in Appendix C for the detailed results. small. Therefore it is not easy to distinguish homogeneous groups of countries in terms of tax progression. Progression is lowest in Spain and Luxembourg, whereas it is highest in Greece and the UK. Tax progression decreases under scenario S1 with a low tax rate in all countries in comparison to the baseline scenario, i.e. the incidence is more proportional. The values for scenario S2 depend on the country, whereas progressivity increases in S3 for all countries. Nevertheless the scenarios can be ranked in terms of all indices of progression in the following way: I P R (S1) < I P R (S2) < I P R (S3):
The introduction of a revenue neutral tax reform always yields gainers and losers. Di¤erent groups of taxpayers are a¤ected di¤erently by tax schedule ‡attening and tax base broadening.
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In the …rst scenario with the lowest tax rates the gains are solely concentrated in the top 1-2 deciles (only in Belgium also involving the 7th and 8th deciles). In the second scenario, some 9th decile households start losing instead of gaining; in the case of Finland and the UK the top decile loses as well while the bottom and middle deciles start gaining. In the third scenario only three countries are left with gains for the top decile (Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 26 See Table 8 in Appendix C for the e¤ect in terms of changes in mean disposable income by deciles. The range of changes is somewhat higher for the …rst (from -9.7% to +12.1%) and the third scenario (-13.1% to 8.0%) compared with the second scenario (-5.5% to 6.2%). . In addition to Finland and the UK, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain also show gains for the lowest deciles. Germany under the third scenario is an exceptional case as only the middle income deciles gain. The changes in mean disposable income are increasing (decreasing) with ‡at tax parameters (i.e. marginal tax rate and basic allowance) for low (high) income households. In other words, the lower (higher) the ‡at tax parameters the higher (lower) are the gains (losses) for high (low) income households. In most countries the relative losses in terms of disposable income remain high (or are even highest) for middle income households. These groups, however, usually play an important role in the political process of a mature welfare state. Thus, these e¤ects might explain why a ‡at tax is not very popular in Western Europe. 28 Households whose disposable income does not change more than 10 euros per month in either direction are regarded as "unchanged". See also Table 11 in Appendix C. Portugal and the UK have most of the people with unchanged income. In the third scenario, only Austria and Luxembourg have still more losers; Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal have again roughly the same share of those gaining and losing and most people in Greece remain still in the 'no-change' category. The highest fraction of winners appears in Belgium and Finland for all scenarios and it is increasing over scenarios for most countries (except for Austria, Germany and Greece). If disposable income was chosen as the only criterion for an election decision, only the third ‡at tax scenario would have a majority in the population (in the sense of more winners than losers) for most countries.
Work incentives: e¤ective average and marginal tax rates
In this section, we analyse the e¤ects of ‡at tax reforms on the e¤ective marginal (EMTR) and average (EATR) income tax rates faced by di¤erent groups of taxpayers as a measure for e¢ ciency e¤ects. The underlying idea is that average and marginal income tax rates a¤ect labour supply and savings incentives. Therefore, changes in e¤ective income tax rates may be considered as rough indicators for distortions caused by the tax system. 29 E¤ective marginal tax rate shows at which rate an additional unit of income is taxed, whereas e¤ective average tax rate shows the proportion of total taxes (including SICs) to market income. 30 Changes in e¤ective average tax rates are of special interest for the extensive labour supply margin which seems to be more important for particular subgroups at the bottom of the income distribution than the intensive margin which is a¤ected by the e¤ective marginal tax rate (see Heckman (1993) and Immervoll et al. (2007) ). One should note, though, that average EMTRs and EATRs, in general, do not allow deriving conclusions for the expected labour supply reactions of individuals. These depend on the individual e¤ective tax rates and their respective labour supply elasticities. 30 We calculate EMTRs for the working age population (those aged 18-64) with positive employment or selfemployment income, increasing earnings of each individual in the household in turn by 3% while the change in all bene…ts and taxes (including social insurance contributions) is observed at the household level. We use the following formula: EM T R i = 1 Yj di , where d i is the income increment for individual i and Y j disposable income of household j to which this individual belongs. The e¤ective average tax rate is also calculated for the working age population as: EAT R i = Ti Xi , where T i is total tax payments and X i the market income of individual i.
31 See Tables 12, 13 and 14 in the appendix for the detailed results. The concentration (polarisation) of the EMTR distribution decreases (increases) with an increasing marginal tax rate, i.e. more people face low or high already di¤er distinctively in the baseline scenario across countries. This can be attributed to several factors like, for example, the overall size of the government (and therefore the demand for public funds) and the general tax mix (i.e. the importance of the income tax) as well as economic di¤erences between the countries. Mediterranean countries with the lowest EMTRs and EATRs have rather low income levels as well as the lowest relative levels of income taxation and social insurance contributions resulting in high inequality and polarisation of the income distribution. Finland and the UK which have average ETRs attribute much more importance to the income tax whereas social insurance contributions are relatively low. These social insurance contributions, however, play an important role in …nancing the Continental European welfare states where SIC are almost as high as income taxes 32 The e¤ective marginal tax burden is rather low in Mediterranean countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal; average in Luxembourg, UK, Finland and the Netherlands, and rather high in Austria, Germany and Belgium. The scenarios can be ranked in the following way (for most countries): EM T R(S1) < EM T R(S2) < EM T R(S3): Therefore, e¤ective marginal rates are increasing with statutory rates although revenue is kept constant. In scenario S1 the EMTRs decrease in all countries in comparison to the baseline, scenarios S2 and S3 depend on the country.
The e¤ective average tax burden is rather low in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Luxembourg; average in the UK, the Netherlands and Austria; and rather high in Finland, Belgium and Germany. The scenarios can be ranked as follows: EAT R(S1) > EAT R(S2) > EAT R(S3): Therefore, increasing the allowance dominates the increase in (statutory) marginal rate and leads to decreasing EATRs although the revenue is kept constant. In scenario S1 the EATRs increase in all countries (except BE) in comparison to the baseline, scenario S3 is always lower and S2 depends on the country.
To sum up, ‡at tax rates required to attain revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances (the …rst scenario) decrease EMTRs in all countries leading to increasing labour supply incentives. 33 On the other hand, (revenue neutral) ‡at rates necessary to keep the inequality levels close to their baseline values (the third scenario) lead to ambiguous e¤ects. Incentives improve in Mediterranean and most Continental countries but worsen in other countries.
EMTRs whereas less individuals face medium EMTRs. 32 See Table 4 in Appendix A for further information. 33 One should note, however, that higher incentives do not necessarily lead to higher labour supply and welfare but depend on the directions of the income and substitution e¤ects based on the respective labour supply elasticities. However, recent studies for the Netherlands by Jacobs et al. (2007) and Germany by Fuest et al. (2008) are comparable with our scenarios S1 and S2. In summary, these studies …nd and increase in labour supply (and inequality) for scenario S1, whereas in scenario S2 inequality is held constant resulting in negligible e¢ ciency e¤ects. 
Summary of results
There are already distinct di¤erences between the analysed countries under the present systems. In terms of distributional measures two groups of countries can be di¤erentiated: inequality, (relative) poverty and richness and polarisation are rather high in Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) and the UK, whereas they are rather low in Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg) and Finland. The variation in the e¤ects of the scenarios across countries is summarised in Table 1 . Di¤erent groups can be classi…ed according to the welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) . In the Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries inequality, poverty and richness increase (and progression decreases) only in scenario S1. In the Southern European countries inequality increases in scenarios S1 and S2. In Continental Europe inequality increases in all three scenarios (except Germany). Incentives increase in all countries for scenarios S1 and S2 (except FI and UK) as well as for Mediterranean and Continental countries in scenario S3.
Our analysis shows that the selection of the schedule and tax base parameters is crucial for the e¤ects of ‡at tax reforms in terms of equity and e¢ ciency. Low parameter values that attain revenue neutrality with existing personal allowances decrease EMTRs and therefore increase labour supply incentives. This, however, leads to more inequality, poverty and polarisation as low rates bene…t mainly those with high incomes at the expense of low and middle income households. On the other hand, higher ‡at rates keep the inequality levels unchanged. However, this does not necessarily imply strong disincentive e¤ects for all countries. In fact, for some countries the EMTRs decrease in all three scenarios resulting in increasing incentives even in for scenario S3 with a high marginal rate.
Conclusion
Flat income taxes have become increasingly popular in Eastern Europe. However, this popularity has not yet reached Western European countries with well-established middle classes. Using EUROMOD we provide a microsimulation analysis of di¤erent ‡at tax designs for selected Western European countries in a common framework. In general, a revenue neutral ‡at tax reform cannot overcome the fundamental equitye¢ ciency trade-o¤. However, in some cases such as Greece, Portugal and Spain an increase in both equity and incentives is possible. These countries have the typical Mediterranean welfare state regime, characterised by high inequality, poverty, richness and polarisation of the income distribution. These distributional characteristics imply a lack of a well-established middle class. Therefore, the distributional e¤ects are less adverse than in countries with a more equal income distribution. Switching to a ‡at tax regime in this setting can reduce inequality and increase e¢ ciency in terms of labour supply incentives. However, the resulting ‡at rates are rather high.
When interpreting these results, one has to be aware of the fact that we limit our analysis to static models. However, ‡at taxes are also supposed to have positive dynamic e¢ ciency and growth e¤ects. 34 These long-term e¤ects might make increasing inequality acceptable.
Nevertheless, the question arises whether a personal income tax reform is the best instrument to increase growth and employment. The user costs of labour and capital play an important role in determining the labour and investment demand. These user costs, however, are determined more by social security contributions and corporate taxes than by personal income tax. Nevertheless, the immediate and short-term distributional e¤ects analysed in this paper are most likely to be decisive for the political feasibility of a ‡at tax reform. The main problem of implementing a ‡at rate tax could be to convince a majority of the population that redistribution in favour of the highest income decile is acceptable. These distributional e¤ects at the expense of the middle class help to explain why ‡at rate taxes have not been successful in the political process in Western Europe. However, our analysis shows that for some Mediterranean countries a ‡at tax can increase both equity and e¢ ciency. This also suggests that these and other countries with similar income distributions and welfare state structures are more prone to follow such reforms. 1 .7 9 1 7 .8 9 
